About me:
I am a philosophy PhD student at the University of Pittsburgh. I did my undergraduate work at Seton Hall University, where I double majored in philosophy and religious studies. I am also currently an editor at 1,000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
For my CV, click here. If you would like to contact me, you can reach me via e-mail.
My research interests range widely over normative ethics, moral epistemology, and metaphysics. Recently, I have been especially interested in three sets of questions:
(1) Is there any reason to lament the separateness of persons? What is the relationship between the separateness of persons and the possibility of loneliness? Can reflection about loneliness tell us anything about the relationship between self-interested reasons and altruistic reasons? When, if ever, is it morally objectionable to look at the world from an impersonal, “selfless” point of view?
(2) What is the moral significance of the past? What, if anything, do we morally owe past generations? To what extent, if any, does the meaningfulness of our current pursuits depend on what past generations did? Might it be the case that an action can be morally wrong to perform now precisely because one would have had to have a morally worse past in order to be willing to perform it? In what ways, if any, does one's personal history influence one's moral obligations?
(3) How should we feel about the fact that most of what we love and cherish is impermanent, that change and loss is all but inevitable? Should we strive to accept that fact? Or is this the sort of loss we should never accept? If it is, what is it about this sort of loss in virtue of which we should not be willing to accept it? When, if ever, is it morally inappropriate to stop caring about something (or someone) one used to care about?
For my CV, click here. If you would like to contact me, you can reach me via e-mail.
My research interests range widely over normative ethics, moral epistemology, and metaphysics. Recently, I have been especially interested in three sets of questions:
(1) Is there any reason to lament the separateness of persons? What is the relationship between the separateness of persons and the possibility of loneliness? Can reflection about loneliness tell us anything about the relationship between self-interested reasons and altruistic reasons? When, if ever, is it morally objectionable to look at the world from an impersonal, “selfless” point of view?
(2) What is the moral significance of the past? What, if anything, do we morally owe past generations? To what extent, if any, does the meaningfulness of our current pursuits depend on what past generations did? Might it be the case that an action can be morally wrong to perform now precisely because one would have had to have a morally worse past in order to be willing to perform it? In what ways, if any, does one's personal history influence one's moral obligations?
(3) How should we feel about the fact that most of what we love and cherish is impermanent, that change and loss is all but inevitable? Should we strive to accept that fact? Or is this the sort of loss we should never accept? If it is, what is it about this sort of loss in virtue of which we should not be willing to accept it? When, if ever, is it morally inappropriate to stop caring about something (or someone) one used to care about?
